Compare commits

..

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
copilot-swe-agent[bot]
447b4438ee Restore inbound and content tag setting before dispatch
As identified in issue #4760, PR #4030 commented out lines that set
inbound and content tags from routing info before dispatch. This broke
domain-based routing for WireGuard connections.

The fix adds back these lines (with mutex-protected access) positioned
right before the Dispatch call, ensuring routing configuration is
properly passed for domain-based routing rules to work.

This addresses the feedback that uncommenting those lines fixes routing.

Co-authored-by: RPRX <63339210+RPRX@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-11 09:13:06 +00:00
copilot-swe-agent[bot]
1f925778ed Complete WireGuard domain routing fix with tests and review
Co-authored-by: RPRX <63339210+RPRX@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-10 22:18:32 +00:00
copilot-swe-agent[bot]
06dee57f8a Add mutex protection for WireGuard routing info
Co-authored-by: RPRX <63339210+RPRX@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-01-10 22:14:55 +00:00
copilot-swe-agent[bot]
7f8928272b Initial plan 2026-01-10 22:04:22 +00:00
3 changed files with 42 additions and 39 deletions

2
go.mod
View File

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ require (
golang.org/x/net v0.48.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.19.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.39.0
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard v0.0.0-20231211153847-12269c276173
google.golang.org/grpc v1.78.0
google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.11
@@ -50,7 +51,6 @@ require (
golang.org/x/text v0.32.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/time v0.12.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.39.0 // indirect
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2 // indirect
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20251029180050-ab9386a59fda // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
goerrors "errors"
"io"
"sync"
"github.com/xtls/xray-core/common"
"github.com/xtls/xray-core/common/buf"
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ var nullDestination = net.TCPDestination(net.AnyIP, 0)
type Server struct {
bindServer *netBindServer
infoMu sync.RWMutex
info routingInfo
policyManager policy.Manager
}
@@ -78,12 +80,14 @@ func (*Server) Network() []net.Network {
// Process implements proxy.Inbound.
func (s *Server) Process(ctx context.Context, network net.Network, conn stat.Connection, dispatcher routing.Dispatcher) error {
s.infoMu.Lock()
s.info = routingInfo{
ctx: ctx,
dispatcher: dispatcher,
inboundTag: session.InboundFromContext(ctx),
contentTag: session.ContentFromContext(ctx),
}
s.infoMu.Unlock()
ep, err := s.bindServer.ParseEndpoint(conn.RemoteAddr().String())
if err != nil {
@@ -120,18 +124,23 @@ func (s *Server) Process(ctx context.Context, network net.Network, conn stat.Con
}
func (s *Server) forwardConnection(dest net.Destination, conn net.Conn) {
if s.info.dispatcher == nil {
errors.LogError(s.info.ctx, "unexpected: dispatcher == nil")
// Make a thread-safe copy of routing info
s.infoMu.RLock()
info := s.info
s.infoMu.RUnlock()
if info.dispatcher == nil {
errors.LogError(info.ctx, "unexpected: dispatcher == nil")
return
}
defer conn.Close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(core.ToBackgroundDetachedContext(s.info.ctx))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(core.ToBackgroundDetachedContext(info.ctx))
sid := session.NewID()
ctx = c.ContextWithID(ctx, sid)
inbound := session.Inbound{} // since promiscuousModeHandler mixed-up context, we shallow copy inbound (tag) and content (configs)
if s.info.inboundTag != nil {
inbound = *s.info.inboundTag
if info.inboundTag != nil {
inbound = *info.inboundTag
}
inbound.Name = "wireguard"
inbound.CanSpliceCopy = 3
@@ -141,8 +150,8 @@ func (s *Server) forwardConnection(dest net.Destination, conn net.Conn) {
// Currently we have no way to link to the original source address
inbound.Source = net.DestinationFromAddr(conn.RemoteAddr())
ctx = session.ContextWithInbound(ctx, &inbound)
if s.info.contentTag != nil {
ctx = session.ContextWithContent(ctx, s.info.contentTag)
if info.contentTag != nil {
ctx = session.ContextWithContent(ctx, info.contentTag)
}
ctx = session.SubContextFromMuxInbound(ctx)
@@ -156,7 +165,16 @@ func (s *Server) forwardConnection(dest net.Destination, conn net.Conn) {
Reason: "",
})
link, err := s.info.dispatcher.Dispatch(ctx, dest)
// Set inbound and content tags from routing info for proper routing
// These were commented out in PR #4030 but are needed for domain-based routing
if info.inboundTag != nil {
ctx = session.ContextWithInbound(ctx, info.inboundTag)
}
if info.contentTag != nil {
ctx = session.ContextWithContent(ctx, info.contentTag)
}
link, err := info.dispatcher.Dispatch(ctx, dest)
if err != nil {
errors.LogErrorInner(ctx, err, "dispatch connection")
}

View File

@@ -290,10 +290,8 @@ func (r *RandCarrier) verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509
// directly return success if pinned cert is leaf
// or add the CA to RootCAs if pinned cert is CA(and can be used in VerifyPeerCertInNames for Self signed CA)
RootCAs := r.RootCAs
var verifyResult verifyResult
var verifiedCert *x509.Certificate
if r.PinnedPeerCertSha256 != nil {
verifyResult, verifiedCert = verifyChain(certs, r.PinnedPeerCertSha256)
verifyResult, verifiedCert := verifyChain(certs, r.PinnedPeerCertSha256)
switch verifyResult {
case certNotFound:
return errors.New("peer cert is unrecognized")
@@ -307,39 +305,27 @@ func (r *RandCarrier) verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509
}
}
if len(r.VerifyPeerCertInNames) > 0 {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: RootCAs,
CurrentTime: time.Now(),
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
for _, opts.DNSName = range r.VerifyPeerCertInNames {
if _, err := certs[0].Verify(opts); err == nil {
return nil
if r.VerifyPeerCertInNames != nil {
if len(r.VerifyPeerCertInNames) > 0 {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: RootCAs,
CurrentTime: time.Now(),
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
for _, opts.DNSName = range r.VerifyPeerCertInNames {
if _, err := certs[0].Verify(opts); err == nil {
return nil
}
}
}
} else if len(verifiedChains) == 0 && verifyResult == foundCA { // if found ca and verifiedChains is empty, we need to verify here
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: RootCAs,
CurrentTime: time.Now(),
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
DNSName: r.Config.ServerName,
}
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
if _, err := certs[0].Verify(opts); err == nil {
return nil
}
}
return nil
}
type RandCarrier struct {
Config *tls.Config
RootCAs *x509.CertPool
VerifyPeerCertInNames []string
PinnedPeerCertSha256 [][]byte
@@ -380,7 +366,6 @@ func (c *Config) GetTLSConfig(opts ...Option) *tls.Config {
SessionTicketsDisabled: !c.EnableSessionResumption,
VerifyPeerCertificate: randCarrier.verifyPeerCert,
}
randCarrier.Config = config
if len(c.VerifyPeerCertInNames) > 0 {
config.InsecureSkipVerify = true
} else {